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 INDIA'S AKALI-BJP ALLIANCE
 The 1997 Legislative
 Assembly Elections
 Gurharpal Singh
 In India's 11th Lok Sabha elections (May 1996), the
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the largest single political party. As
 speculation intensified about the possibility of the BJP forming its first ever
 national government, one regional party, the Akali Dal (Badal) (AD[B]),
 made a public declaration of support for the BJP's claim, which surprised
 many observers. Why, they wondered, was the Sikhs' premier political rep-
 resentative prepared to give support to the leading Hindu nationalist party?
 Was there not something fundamentally irreconcilable in the AD(B)-sup-
 ported Sikh agitation in favor of regional political and cultural autonomy as
 proposed in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) and the BJP's national
 agenda for a common national culture as espoused in Hindutva ideology?
 How could two such parties become political bedfellows?
 This paper analyzes the emergence of the Akali-BJP alliance within the
 context of regional and national political developments since the early 1990s,
 examining the tactical, strategic, and ideological factors that have enabled the
 two parties to coalesce and thereby unlock the "Punjab problem" while si-
 multaneously projecting an alternative agenda for national Indian politics.
 Particular emphasis is given to post-1992 regional and national developments
 and the significance of the February 1997 Punjab Legislative Assembly
 (PLA) elections that resulted in a landslide victory for the AD(B)-BJP alli-
 ance.
 Although the recent minority national governments have rekindled interest
 in coalition politics in India, combinations of ideologically opposed parties
 have been common at the provincial level. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Com-
 munist parties (CPI and CPI[M]) developed the concept of "United Fronts,"
 Gurharpal Singh is Principal Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Hu-
 manities and Social Sciences, De Montfort University, Leicester, England.
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 "Democratic Fronts," and "Left Fronts." One of the leading practitioners of
 such fronts, Harkrishan Singh Surjeet, has coordinated the United Front com-
 bine of 16 parties that has been led successively by Deve Gowda (May 1996
 to April 1997) and I. K. Gujral (after April 1997) as prime ministers.1 Surjeet
 initially perfected his art in Punjab after the 1967 PLA elections, when a
 combination of the Akali Dal, Jana Sangh (the BJP's forerunner), and the
 Communist parties defeated the Congress.2 Applying formula Marxism,
 Surjeet rationalized these fronts in terms of developing a "Democratic Front."
 In reality, however, the fronts (especially between 1967 and 1971) were inef-
 fective in challenging Congress hegemony in the state, which was sustained
 by the frequent use of President's Rule under Indira Gandhi. The Akali-BJP
 alliance of the 1990s appears to pose a serious challenge to this hegemony.
 In conditions where Congress dominance has collapsed, the Akalis are seek-
 ing to establish themselves as a pre-eminent regional political party, while the
 BJP views this arrangement as the first of many regional pacts that would
 lead it to national power.3
 This development needs to be understood against the background of how
 these two parties ideologically construct the other. For the BJP and its sister
 organizations, Sikhism is essentially a militant, "martial face" of Hinduism.
 At the height of the troubles in 1984, a BJP resolution declared, "The Sikh
 Panth was born to protect Hinduism, and the venerable Gurus sacrificed
 themselves and their dear children to protect Hindu honor. The Sikh contri-
 bution to the strength and prosperity of India is magnificent, and the nation is
 truly grateful."4
 These words were backed by deeds insofar as the BJP and its associated
 organizations offered a sympathetic ear to Akali politicians when the ruling
 Congress (I) was condoning the pogroms against Sikhs in Delhi. At the same
 time, because the BJP does not acknowledge religious separatism among the
 Sikhs, it is vehemently opposed to claims for political separatism. The BJP
 followed a hard line against the armed struggle for Khalistan throughout the
 1980s; like the Congress (I), it sees the ASR as a potentially secessionist
 document.
 The AD(B), on the other hand, as the leading practitioner of machine poli-
 tics within Sikhdom, considers that the ideological baggage of the BJP has
 been elided in the language of the "older brother" and the party's anti-Con-
 1. For the role of Surjeet as a backseat driver of the United Front, see India Today (New
 Delhi), December 31, 1996.
 2. T. R. Sharma, "Diffusion and Accommodation: The Contending Strategies of the Congress
 Party and the Akali Dal in Punjab," Pacific Affairs 59:4, pp. 634-54.
 3. Sunday Tribune (Chandigarh), February 23, 1997.
 4. Quoted in C. Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the
 1990s (London: Hurst and Company, 1996), p. 345.
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 gress (I) credentials. Because ideological pragmatism has been an AD(B)
 hallmark, the sternest critics of such an alliance have come from among Sikh
 radicals and militants, especially the Akali Dal faction led by Simmeranjit
 Singh Mann (AD[M]). The AD(M) has consistently sought to project the
 Sikh question as an issue of minorities alongside the struggle of lower castes
 and India's Muslims. Hence, although the potential for assimilating Sikhs
 within Hinduism as the price for the AD(B)'s alliance with the BJP seems to
 be the greatest threat to a distinct Sikh identity since the late 19th century,
 political realists within the AD(B) apparently have calculated that this alli-
 ance provides the maximum scope for preserving Sikh identity and, indeed,
 advancing the agenda for political autonomy.5
 Punjab and Political Developments
 Since 1992
 The BJP's rise to national prominence in the 1990s has been accompanied by
 its spectacular growth in the northern regions, where it has ruled state govern-
 ments in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat,
 Madhya Pradesh, and, in alliance with the Shiv Sena, Maharashtra. While
 many factors have contributed to this rise,6 the BJP's stance on internal insur-
 gencies in Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeastern states has struck a chord
 with the anxieties of India's Hindu population. Yet, in contrast to Kashmir,
 the party's position on Sikh militancy and the Punjab question marked a dis-
 tinct shift after the 1992 PLA elections. Most leading Akali factions boy-
 cotted these elections, resulting in a landslide victory for the Congress (I) in
 one of the lowest voter turnouts in Punjab since 1947.7 Under the fig leaf of
 such legitimacy, the Congress (I) administration of Beant Singh intensified
 the strategy of violent control against both Sikh militant and moderate polit-
 ical leadership.8 Politically harassed within Punjab, the moderates became
 active in Sikh politics outside the state. In the December 1993 elections to
 the Delhi Assembly, moderate Akalis encouraged Sikh voters in the capital to
 vote for the BJP. Delhi was one of the few successes for the BJP after the
 1992 demolition of the Ayodhya mosque and the presidential dismissal of its
 governments in four states. The new BJP government in the capital recipro-
 5. Since pre-independence, Akali Dal tactical alliances with political parties have largely been
 determined by possibilities they offer for advancing and protecting the interests of the Sikh com-
 munity. For a classic study, see Baldev Raj Nayer, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton:
 Princeton University Press, 1966). The AD(B)'s embrace of the BJP appears to be true to form.
 6. Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, ch. 11.
 7. Gurharpal Singh, "Punjab Elections 1992: Breakthrough or Breakdown?" Asian Survey
 32:11 (November 1992), pp. 988-99.
 8. Gurharpal Singh, "Punjab Since 1984: Disorder, Order and Legitimacy," ibid., 34:4 (April
 1996), pp. 410-21.
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 cated this support by declaring Punjabi as a second language and launching
 cases against anti-Sikh rioters (mainly Congress supporters) of 1984.9 The
 rapprochement between the two parties, however, took time to consolidate:
 the proposal for an alliance against Congress (I) strengthened only after the
 1996 Lok Sabha elections in which the two parties forged an "understanding"
 that led to AD(B) victory in 8 of the 13 seats from Punjab.10
 The fortunes of the Congress (I) have been in sharp decline since the late
 1980s; only the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 prevented the party's
 defeat in the 10th Lok Sabha elections in June that year. For the new minor-
 ity national government headed by Narasimha Rao, a victory in PLA elec-
 tions was accompanied by Congress (I) success for 12 Punjab Lok Sabha
 seats. These additional MPs provided a critical boost to the party at a time
 when it was desperately seeking to establish an overall majority in Parlia-
 ment. The triumph in Punjab was used to intensify counterinsurgency opera-
 tions against Sikh militants. The new administration gave a free rein to the
 security services to crush armed resistance, even though this resulted in high
 casualties among nonmilitant civilians.1" By early 1993, most of the leading
 militant organizations had been smashed, but the Congress (I) was unable to
 transform this achievement into an enduring legitimacy.12 With a crippling
 fiscal debt and the reluctance of the national government to deliver the out-
 standing provisions of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, the administration was
 compelled to engage in ideological warfare against Sikh militancy by pro-
 scribing the activities of Sikh moderates. The standard bearers of this policy
 were Chief Minister Beant Singh and K. P. S. Gill, the chief of police. The
 assassination of Beant Singh in August 1995 by a suicide bomber, however,
 deprived the Congress (I) of his firm leadership and implicated Gill in the
 security lapses, which resulted in his subsequent removal from Punjab.
 Harcharn Singh Brar, Beant Singh's successor, was reluctant to wage an
 ideological war against Sikhdom. He preferred instead to reopen issues
 within the 1985 Rajiv-Longowal Accord, in particular the vexing question of
 sharing water with neighboring states, over which he maintained remarkable
 consistency since 1992. Even Brar's moderate leadership failed to lift the
 Congress (I) as the party became increasingly associated with decay, corrup-
 tion, and systematic abuse of human rights. When the party suffered a humil-
 iating defeat in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections in Punjab, retaining only two of
 the 12 seats it had won in 1991, the new leader in New Delhi, national Con-
 gress (I) leader Sitaram Kesri ousted Brar and replaced him with a loyalist,
 9. Des Pardes (Punjabi, Southall), December 17, 1993.
 10. India Today (IT), May 31, 1997.
 11. Jane's Defence Weekly (London), June 23, 1993.
 12. Singh, "Punjab Since 1984," pp. 418-21.
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 Rajinder Kaur Bhattal.13 But Bhattal's plan to revive the fortunes of the
 Congress (I) with a populist 51-point program on the eve of the elections
 backfired as the Election Commission, suspecting a pre-election spending
 spree, advanced the date of the polls.14
 Within Sikh politics, violent counterinsurgency eliminated the militants,
 marginalized the radicals, and ultimately succeeded in strengthening the mod-
 erates. As counterinsurgency operations smashed the armed and democratic
 militants after 1992,15 their political residue sought refuge with the radicals.
 Between 1992 and 1994-as in the years between 1985 and 198716-the
 factional struggle for dominance was largely conducted within the Shiromani
 Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), the "Sikh political system." Con-
 fronted with the Beant administration's onslaught, the radicals and the SGPC
 under Gurcharan Singh Tohra sought to forge a united Sikh political front by
 employing the ideological, institutional, and factional resources of
 Sikhdom.17 In this endeavor they inducted the services of the jathedar (head
 priest) of Akal Takht (the source of temporal authority among Sikhs). Under
 his sponsorship, six moderate and radical Akali factions merged in May 1994
 to form the Akali Dal (Amritsar) (AD[A]). This merger was followed by the
 Amritsar Declaration, which called for the formation of "an independent Sikh
 homeland wherein the community would be free to profess and propagate
 Sikhism without interference from any quarter."18 The main moderate group,
 notably the AD(B), stood aloof from the SGPC's and the jathedar's efforts to
 ensnare it in a unity dialogue. Subsequently, the AD(B) demonstrated the
 strength of its political machine in the successful PLA by-election of May
 1994. Emerging as the leading political representative of the Sikh commu-
 nity, the AD(B) acquired significant factional defections from the AD(A)
 and, perhaps more importantly, moderated the antics of Tohra, who had engi-
 neered the unity moves. Tohra and AD(B) leader Prakash Singh Badal
 reached a compromise in February 1995: the former agreed to restrict his
 activities to religion and the latter would lead the political program. Tohra's
 ambitions were further clipped by the AD(B)'s victory in the SGPC elections
 in 1996. Overall, these developments further enhanced the status of the
 13. IT, December 15, 1996.
 14. Ibid., January 31, 1997.
 15. Sikh political leadership since the early 1980s has been divided into four main categories:
 the moderates, radicals, democratic militants, and armed militants. For a discussion of the signif-
 icance of these categories, see Singh, "Punjab Elections 1992."
 16. Gurharpal Singh, "The Punjab Problem in the 1990s: A Post-1984 Assessment," Journal
 of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 25:2 (July 1991), pp. 175-91.
 17. For a discussion of the Sikh political system, see P. Wallace and S. Chopra, eds., Political
 Dynamics of Punjab (Amritsar: Department of Political Science, Guru Nanak Dev University,
 1981), pp. 1-32.
 18. Hindu (international ed., Madras), May 7, 1994.
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 AD(B) and, together with the success of the party in the May 1996 Lok
 Sabha elections, appeared to vindicate its slogan of "Panth, Punjab, and
 Punjabiat" (Sikh community, Punjab, and Punjabiness).19
 The Campaign for PLA Elections
 and the Result
 In the prelude to the PLA election campaign, nearly all political parties in the
 state felt it prudent to make seat adjustments with rivals in order to mitigate
 the large seat swings inherent in the first-past-the-post electoral system. The
 AD(B)'s base in the Sikh peasantry nicely complemented the BJP's urban
 Hindu constituency. The Congress (I) was unable to attract a major partner
 and had to be content with the support of the CPI. The CPI(M) under the
 tutelage of Surjeet floated a much publicized "third front" that also included
 the Janata Dal and the Samajwadi Janata Dal. The Bahujan Samaj Party
 (BSP), a key player in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, was unable to strike a
 deal with either the AD(B) or the Congress (I). It fought the election in
 alliance with AD(M), a remnant of AD(A).
 The AD(B)'s manifesto for the elections was a mixture of rural populism
 and a reassertion of the demands predating the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, tem-
 pered with the need to emphasize Hindu-Sikh unity. The party pledged to
 fight for "true federalism as contained in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of
 1978." This commitment included the repudiation of all previous accords on
 the adjudication of interstate river waters, the postponement of the Satluj-
 Yamuna Link project, the transfer of Chandigarh and other Punjabi speaking
 areas to the state, and the proposal to set up a human rights commission in the
 state. For the peasantry, the party promised free power to tubewells, free
 canal water for irrigation, and a hike in procurement prices of agricultural
 produces in line with the consumer price index. A range of other measures
 was also proposed to attract industry, encourage development, and enhance
 democratization. The manifesto concluded with the need to "maintain peace
 in Punjab at all costs."20
 The Congress (I) in turn repudiated the ASR as secessionist but promised
 to work for the implementation of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord as the frame-
 work for resolving the outstanding issues of river waters, Chandigarh, and the
 Punjabi-speaking areas. As well as a proposal targeted at the poor and an-
 other supporting reservations (affirmative action) for women, the party
 sought to frighten voters by pronouncing that the Akalis had "formed a sui-
 19. Sunday Tribune, February 16, 1997.
 20. Tribune (daily, Chandigarh) January 28, 1997.
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 cide squad of one lakh [100,000] persons whose main target was to kill
 Hindus."21
 The BJP's election manifesto echoed many of the AD(B) promises but
 differed in one significant respect: while maintaining its opposition to the
 ASR, the BJP proposed instead to implement the report of the Sarkaria Com-
 mission to increase powers to the states and stop the misuse of Article 356
 (which gives the central government the power to dismiss state governments)
 that had perpetuated the "Congress raj." In place of decentralization and fed-
 eralism, the BJP document spoke of "devolution" consistent with the "unity
 and integrity of the country." However, Atul Vajpayee insisted that this main
 policy disagreement between the two parties was not a major stumbling
 block: the AD(B) had, after all, committed itself to "guaranteeing peace, na-
 tional integrity, and communal harmony."22
 The election campaign itself was limited to two weeks. Almost 70,000
 police personnel and 100,000 paramilitary forces were deployed across the
 state to ensure free, fair, and peaceful polling at 18,097 polling stations of
 which 1,057 were identified as "hypersensitive" and 2,744 as "sensitive."23
 In spite of the heavy security personnel presence, electioneering was marked
 by the colorful campaigning traditionally associated with Indian elections,
 and turnout was high even in areas that had been the hotbeds of militancy.
 The strict enforcement of the Code of Conduct by the Election Commission-
 ers resulted in, among other things, an alcohol ban during the campaign itself.
 In all, 693 candidates contested for the PLA elections (see Table 1).
 The AD(B)-BJP alliance won a landslide victory by capturing 93 of 117
 assembly seats and almost 48% of the votes polled. The AD(B) did particu-
 larly well in rural (70) and semi-rural (24) constituencies, making a virtual
 clean sweep of the Malwa region and with a strong showing in the Majha and
 the Doaba. The potential threat from AD(M) failed to materialize as that
 party secured only one seat despite fielding 29 candidates. The AD(B)'s
 share of the popular vote was slightly less than the record 38% achieved by
 Akali Dal (Longowal) in the "friendly" PLA elections of 1985.24
 The BJP also did better than was expected, winning its highest number of
 seats since linguistic reorganization. The party's performance was strongest
 in urban and semi-urban constituencies where traditionally it has competed
 with the Congress (I) and the BSP. As the Hindu vote swung behind the BJP,
 the Congress (I)'s position was undermined by competition from the BSP.
 The overall percentage of the BJP share of the popular vote as compared to
 1992 actually fell by nearly 6% because the party focused its efforts on mo-
 21. Ibid., January 29, 1997.
 22. Ibid.
 23. India News Network Digest (Bowling Green, Ohio), February 6, 1992.
 24. Ajit (daily, Punjabi, Jalandhar), February 11, 1997.
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 TABLE 1 Punjab Legislative Assembly Elections 1997
 Party Candidates Seats Won % Vote Polled
 Akali Dal (Badal) 92 75 37.2
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 22 18 10.6
 Congress (I) 105 14 26.4
 Bahujan Samaj Party 67 1 7.5
 Communist Party of India (CPI) 14 2 2.9
 Akali Dal (Mann) 29 1 2.9
 Independents and others* 364 6 12.8
 Total 693 117 100
 SOURCES: India Today (February 28, 1997); Tribune (February 11, 1997); Ajit (February
 11, 1997); and Des Pardes (February 21, 1997).
 NOTE: Turnout: 69.9%.
 * Others include the CPI(M), Janata Dal, Samajwadi Party, and the Samajwadi Janata Party.
 bilizing the urban Hindu vote in 23 seats (including one contested by its
 Akali ally) that the Congress (I) had won in 1992.
 The biggest loser of the elections was the Congress (I). Its share of seats
 collapsed from 87 in 1992 to 14; the party's share of the popular vote also fell
 dramatically to 26%. The Congress (I) was virtually wiped out in its tradi-
 tional stronghold in the Doaba where its vote collapsed from nearly 40% in
 the Lok Sabha elections nine months earlier, to only 26.7%. Its performance
 in the Majha region was also unimpressive: many leading Congressmembers
 in the Majha actually refused to participate in the contest, and the party did
 not win a single seat. In the Malwa region the party relied heavily on local-
 ized support. It retained only 9 of the 63 seats in this area, and it won barely
 a quarter of the total vote. The expulsion of the Malwa-based former Chief
 Minister Brar just before the elections resulted in widespread dissent that
 allegedly undermined the party's position in some two dozen seats.25
 The minor parties were spectacularly unsuccessful. Whereas the Commu-
 nist parties relied on localized support, the BSP was the main casualty of
 failing to ally with a major party before the elections. The party's share of
 seats collapsed from 9 in 1992 to 1 in 1997, and its share of the vote declined
 from 16.2% to 7.5%. Kanshi Ram, the BSP leader who had hoped to make
 himself the kingmaker between Congress (I) and the AD(B), proved to be
 particularly inept at managing to acquire an effective partner. Had he been
 able to do so, the state's 28% Dalit vote could have been decisive in deter-
 25. Tribune, February 2, 1997; Ajit, February 11, 1997.
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 mining the outcome in at least 26 constituencies. In the event, the party's
 stance frustrated the Congress (I) and rewarded the BJP.
 The BJP-Akali Dal(B) Alliance:
 Prospects for the Future
 The AD(B)-BJP alliance's emphatic victory marks a decisive turning point in
 the configuration of political forces that have been party to the "Punjab prob-
 lem." Previous efforts by the AD(B) and its predecessors to build a regional
 anti-Congress coalition have been frustrated by the regular defection from
 such coalitions by minor political parties-Communists and BSP-as well as
 the factional penetration of Akali legislators by the Congress (I). For the first
 time, the alignment of the AD(B) with a dominant anti-Congress (I) national
 party appears to foreclose the prospects of such a development while provid-
 ing a model for the BJP to emulate in other states.
 In contrast, because the Congress (I) and the minor parties in Punjab have
 always looked toward their patrons in New Delhi to influence events in Pun-
 jab, they are likely to lobby hard to make the life of the Akali-BJP adminis-
 tration difficult. No Akali administration has completed its full term and
 President's Rule has been regularly imposed to oust Akali governments. Giv-
 en the strength of the AD(B) and the BJP, it is perhaps premature to assume
 that President's Rule will be imposed in the immediate future, especially as
 the Congress (I)'s defeat in Punjab was identified with Kesri's new national
 leadership. But as the Congress (I)'s influence extends over the national
 United Front government and the latter itself has imploded, the Congress (I)
 and the United Front leadership's temptation to interfere in Punjab will be
 difficult to resist-particularly if new national elections bring a Congress (I)
 government to power. In the last two decades, the pretext for such interven-
 tion has been the mismanagement of law and order by the state governments.
 In addition, the ministry's fortunes will be influenced by its ability to fulfil its
 economic promises, the resolution of the outstanding Punjab issues, and the
 short- and medium-term calculations of the alliance for regional and national
 power.
 The issue of law and order was pushed to the fore within months after the
 coalition came to power. While in opposition, the AD(B) had promised a
 thorough review of the "security state" that had waged the war of counterin-
 surgency against militancy. In fact, as "violent control" was dismantled after
 1995, individual petitions against police were heard with greater frequency in
 the High and Supreme Courts. Allegations against the Punjab police have
 accelerated; nearly 1,200 cases have been registered against serving police
 officers and one-sixth of the total police force is vulnerable to indictment.26
 26. IT, June 9, 1997.
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 This situation has arisen because political leaders have failed to find a settle-
 ment that would effectively end violent control. Such a settlement would
 necessarily include both compensation to victims and protection to security
 services. In the event, police officers who were at the forefront of counterin-
 surgency have, in the words of Gill, become the new victims in which "public
 interest litigation has become the most convenient strategy for vendetta."27
 The suicide of former police officer A. S. Sandhu, who had waged a ruthless
 war against Sikh militancy in the border area, was taken up by Gill as a
 spokesman of the beleaguered police officers.28 His call for a constitutional
 commission to examine the issue has been echoed by that of human rights
 organizations in Punjab seeking a parallel commission-along the lines of
 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission-to examine the whole
 dimension of counterinsurgency. The AD(B)-BJP government is committed
 to preserving law and order, and it is suspicious of the recent spate of bomb-
 ings in Punjab. The government suspects that disgruntled elements within
 the security services may be playing the role of agents provocateurs they
 perfected during the counterinsurgency. Timely acts of terror have destabi-
 lized previous administrations in Punjab; the AD(B)-BJP alliance is very con-
 scious of this fact as well as of Punjab's history of the assassination of
 leading politicians.
 The alliance has also had to confront, in its economic plans, the reality of a
 debt trap that has increased since the early 1990s. At the end of March 1996,
 the outstanding special loans debt to the center was nearly $1.6 billion. Spe-
 cial pleas for cancellation of this loan notwithstanding, the previous Congress
 (I) administration succeeded in obtaining only a waiver in the annual interest
 payment on the loan of nearly $213 million. Estimates suggest that this inter-
 est will increase to $226 million in 1997-98 and rise to $271 million in
 2001-02.29 Servicing this loan has created a fiscal debt ratio of nearly 30%
 for the Punjab government.30 Against this high rate of indebtedness, the first
 budget introduced by the alliance in June 1997 actually increased taxes while
 the budget recorded an overall deficit of $93.8 million. Apart from a few
 symbolic acts, such as reducing the police budget by Rs 270 million, little
 headway has been made in fulfilling the alliance's generous promises to in-
 dustry or agriculture.3' Perhaps most remarkable of all, the chief minister
 has been unable to secure an upward revision of agricultural procurement
 prices-set annually by the center-that have deflated agricultural incomes
 and are, for example in the case of wheat, considerably below the market
 27. See K. P. S. Gill's open letter to the prime minister, Sunday Tribune, June 1, 1997.
 28. Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) June 21, 1997.
 29. Sunday Tribune, March 2, 1997.
 30. Ibid., March 23, 1997.
 31. Des Pardes, June 20, 1997.
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 price.32 The initiative to set up a nonresident cell may increase the pitifully
 low level of non-resident Indian investment in the state, but it is unlikely to
 generate the resources required to meet the promises made to the agricultural
 sector or provide for further development. The debt trap, like the issue of law
 and order, will increase the vulnerability of the government to interference
 from the center.
 Facing a high degree of indebtedness, the alliance, particularly the AD(B),
 may be inclined to revive the agitation for the settlement of outstanding Pun-
 jab demands over the transfer of Chandigarh, the Punjabi-speaking areas, and
 the river waters dispute. Such a mobilization, as in 1982, is vulnerable to
 outflanking by an ideological challenge by militants and radicals from within
 the Sikh political system. A challenge of this sort could become reality if the
 alliance were unable to deliver on these demands following such a mobiliza-
 tion. The vanquished and disgruntled factions within Sikhdom are eager to
 wage the ideological battle, and their fires might be easily stoked, as in the
 past, by a Congress (I) in opposition. An early indication of this became
 apparent in the Akal Takht's honoring of the families of assassins of Indira
 Gandhi and General Vaidya in April 1997.
 For the BJP, in contrast, championing the Punjab demands is fraught with
 difficulties. Apart from being at odds with the AD(B) over the reform of
 center-state relations and the ASR, the party would have to placate its gov-
 ernment in Rajasthan and partners in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh-who
 would be disadvantaged in any agreement favoring Punjab. The Congress (I)
 deliberately stalled on implementing the Rajiv-Longowal Accord for over a
 decade because of its fear of destabilizing Congress (I) governments in these
 states; the BJP is likely to follow suit given the national benefits of assuaging
 its units and allies in these states at the expense of the AD(B). Since 1985 no
 national government-even one with such an overwhelming majority as the
 Congress (I) under Rajiv Gandhi-has been able to deliver on the Rajiv-
 Longowal Accord. The commitment of any future national BJP to effect
 such a package must be seen against this background and the coded misgiv-
 ings it expressed about the ASR.
 If a national BJP government is able to deliver a Punjab package, there
 certainly would be potential for the AD(B)-BJP alliance to become strategic.
 The differences between the two parties may be overcome by political sym-
 bolism such as the BJP' s support for AD(B)' s candidate (Surjit Singh
 Barnala) in the elections to the vice-presidency of India.33 Political rhetoric,
 after all, is really the stuff of Indian politics; and if the BJP is twin tracking in
 a tactical accommodation of the AD(B) (and other regional parties) to capture
 32. Sunday Tribune, February 23, 1997.
 33. IT, July 14, 1997.
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 national power, then these parties and the AD(B) are aware of the potential
 bargaining power they can wield in New Delhi, as the recent formation of the
 BJP government and its National Agenda for Governance demonstrated. Yet,
 such independence for the AD(B) is unlikely to produce results given the
 record of non-BJP governments. In the long term, therefore, the strategic
 advantage to AD(B) of an alliance with the BJP lies in the possibility of the
 BJP, its rhetoric apart, giving it maximum room to satisfy the party's ambi-
 tions at the regional level and accommodate its ethnic pride without trigger-
 ing a fratricidal factionalism within Sikhdom that has traditionally benefited
 the Congress (I). If there is a "growing realization within the BJP leadership
 that the objective of coming to power in New Delhi cannot be achieved until
 the party is ready to constructively integrate regional sentiments and aspira-
 tions,"34 then regional sentiments will also determine the degree of accom-
 modation as well as the BJP's agenda.35 The paradox of the BJP's drive
 toward majoritarianism is that the party's ideological agenda may be practical
 only in its core "Hindi belt," yet its appeal must reach far beyond for na-
 tional-level success.
 Conclusion
 It is tempting to see the AD(B)-BJP alliance as pragmatic, opportunistic, and
 tactical. In reality it has been forged as a consequence of the ideologically
 charged politics of violent control practiced by national and regional Con-
 gress (I) governments in Punjab that fostered Sikh militancy and, ultimately,
 castrated the political activities of Sikh moderates. Ideological differences
 notwithstanding-differences that are in many ways more apparent than
 real-the parties have much in common in shaping a new regional and na-
 tional dimension to Indian politics. For the AD(B) the basis of this dimen-
 sion is to establish regional political hegemony alongside the restoration of
 Sikh ethnic pride. The BJP's national project is to establish a new framework
 of hegemonic control that would promote Hindutva in place of the Congress
 (I)'s "pseudo-secularism." Both parties may well be excluded from political
 office by the powerful political combinations arrayed against them. But
 whereas the Punjab model of alignment with a regional party offers the BJP a
 tantalizing vision of power in New Delhi, the physical elimination of militant
 Sikh nationalism in the early 1990s has fostered in the AD(B) a new realism
 that sees the BJP as offering the best hope for maintaining a distinct Sikh
 identity and achieving maximum political autonomy within the Indian union.
 34. Sunday Tribune, February 23, 1997.
 35. For a recent statement of the BJP on center-state relations, see IT, July 9, 1997.
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